Network Industries in the New Economy by John, McGee & Tanya, Sammut-Bonnici
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Network Industries in the New Economy
McGee John and Sammut-Bonnici Tanya
2002
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50623/
MPRA Paper No. 50623, posted 27 October 2013 12:56 UTC
Pre print copy    
 
Reference of published article: McGee, John and Sammut-Bonnici, Tanya. (2002) Network industries in 
the new economy. European Business Journal, Volume 14 (Number 5). pp. 116-132. ISSN 0955-808X 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Network Industries in the New Economy 
 
John McGee 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick, 
E-mail: J.McGee@WBS.ac.uk 
 
Tanya Sammut Bonnici 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick 
E-mail: Tanya.Sammut-Bonnici@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we discuss two propositions: the supply and demand of knowledge, and network 
externalities. We outline the characteristics that distinguish knowledge-intensive industries from 
the general run of manufacturing and service businesses. Knowledge intensity and knowledge 
specialisation has developed as markets and globalisation have grown, leading to progressive 
incentives to outsource and for industries to deconstruct.  The outcome has been a mixture of 
more intensive competition laced with points and periods of high differentiation.  The paper 
looks at what is potentially the most powerful economic mechanism: positive feedback, 
alternatively known as demand-side increasing returns, network effects, or network 
externalities.  This section provides the basis for alternative demand curves that incorporate 
positive feedback and derives their potential economic and strategic consequences. We argue 
that the propositions of knowledge supply and demand, and the dynamics of network 
externalities create new situations for our traditional industrial economy such that new types of 
economies of scale are emerging and ‘winner takes all’ strategies are having more influence. 
Our second paper takes the argument further and looks at the nature of firms’ strategies in the 
new world arguing that attention to technology standards, technical platforms, consumer 
networks, and supply chain strategies have created a significant contribution to strategy models 
within the new economy. 
Introduction 
The academic literature has seen much discussion of ‘increasing returns’ and ‘positive feedback 
effects’ especially since Arthur’s two seminal papers in 1989.  The popular business and 
financial press has produced endless discussions of the high-tech industries, the dot.com 
revolution, and the ‘new economy’. With the bursting of the dot.com bubble and apparent 
overselling of high-tech stocks, particularly telecommunications stocks it may seem that a high-
technology bubble has been and gone and that normal times have returned and we can revert 
back to normal economics.  This paper argues that this is too simplistic a view and too sanguine 
by half.  We argue first that knowledge intensive industries are a fact of life and that their 
economic characteristics have significant and enduring implications.  We join with others in 
acknowledging that microelectronics has had a powerful impact on the nature of competition 
through commoditisation of products and innovation in distribution channels.  But we point out 
that the more powerful strategic impact has to be seen through the new industry structures now 
evident in the supply chains that run from telecommunications through to new dot.com 
companies.  We put both knowledge-intensity and the new industries alongside the notion of 
positive feedback effects to argue that this is the platform from which major new competitive 
forces are emerging.  These sit alongside traditional industry structures but also contain 
important new strategic lessons.  It is from this vantage point that we can observe a new 
strategic logic at work that requires new approaches to the analysis of industries, a different and 
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novel conception of generic strategies, and new ways of strategising in companies. This is not 
entirely new.  The idea of positive feedback effects and increasing returns has been around ever 
since the growth of the Victorian utilities. However, its effects have been seen as derived from 
the supply side increasing returns and natural monopoly characteristics of those industries.  It is 
the conjunction of these effects with knowledge specialisation and knowledge intensity that 
makes the modern argument distinctive.  
This paper discusses two propositions: the supply and demand of knowledge and network 
externalities. We argue that these propositions create new situations for our traditional industrial 
economy (the old economy) such that new types of economies of scale are emerging and 
‘winner takes all’ strategies are becoming prevalent.  
Our second paper takes the argument further and looks at the nature of firms’ strategies in the 
new world (the new economy) arguing that attention to technology standards, technical 
platforms, consumer networks, and supply chain strategies have created a significant 
contribution to strategy models within the new economy.  
Knowledge Economics in the Network Economy 
In the past fifty years, the world has witnessed the rise of information and communication 
technologies (ICT). It has changed the nature of the commercial environment and has increased 
the speed of operation, driven by the increase in connectivity between companies, and between 
companies and their customers. Network industries such as telecommunications, internet, 
computing and software, have had a significant role in shaping the corporate environment into a 
new network economy. (The structure and nature of network industries and the network 
economy is discussed in Part II of the paper.)  
 
Do the same economic ‘laws’ hold for the new network economy as for the traditional industrial 
economy?  This question has attracted much attention in business and in academia.  The popular 
press has been excited by the possibility of a New World (perhaps not a ‘brave New World’ in a 
Huxleyan sense) in which the old economics is somehow stood on its head.  Academic 
economists have generally been more curmudgeonly.  Shapiro and Varian (1999) in their 
excellent book on the information economy assert ‘Technology changes.  Economic laws do 
not.’ Shapiro and Varian recognise these dynamics but maintain that whilst technologies 
change, economic rules do not. The impact of the Internet and computer networks is similar to 
railways, electricity and telecommunications, although these industries had significantly 
different growth rates. Dumont (2000) criticises Shapiro and Varian’s stance on the basis of a 
new type of market failure driven by technology, high-risk network externalities (discussed later 
on), and zero marginal costs.  
We are witnessing a new commercial scenario: networks no longer belong to a single firm. 
Strategy goes beyond the efficient use of network structure and the relevant allocation of cost. 
Collaboration between firms has become mandatory for intra-network compatibility, a feature 
that is crucial in telecommunications. Collaboration and anti monopoly pressures have led to a 
shift towards fragmented ownership and oligopolistic circumstances. Underpinning networks 
and the growth of collaboration are the well-known characteristics of information goods, such as 
digitised information such as recorded music, software, football scores, encyclopaedias, and 
telephone directories: 
1. High fixed costs but low to vanishing marginal costs, thus high costs of creating intellectual 
property, but low costs of reproduction 
2. Low costs of copying intellectual property 
3. Information is an experience good every time it is consumed 
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4. With easy access to information, there is information overload – value arises from location, 
filtering and communicating what is useful. Search engines facilitate the exercise. 
5. An extensive, expensive technology infrastructure is required to produce and distribute 
information. 
6. Pricing is value-based, rather than cost-based. 
However, these characteristics on their own do not produce exceptional results.  They do result 
in an emphasis on volume and a tendency in certain circumstances, for example in fragmented 
markets, for price to fall precipitously towards marginal cost, i.e. to zero. But information 
products  are susceptible to differentiation   to convey quality signals and endorsement (e.g. the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica name). Such products are customised through timing (e.g. Amazon’s 
mail shots through its Permission Marketing programs) or individual customer data in the form 
of personalised web sites.  At the same time the low marginal cost characteristics of information 
goods make it attractive to create dedicated distribution channels for information transfer (one 
way or two way) through which information differentiation can also be attempted. We have 
experienced this differentiation as the basis for e-commerce and the growth of the Internet.   
 
On the basis of these characteristics, there has been a systematic and ever-increasing shift from 
the traditional Industrial Economy to a Knowledge-based or Information Economy.  The next 
section outlines the basis for this evolution/revolution. 
The Demand and Supply of Knowledge 
A key strategy in developing knowledge industries is to create a capability to analyse an 
organisation’s current knowledge processing environment, both on the ‘supply side’ of securing 
and providing existing knowledge and the ‘demand side’ of knowledge creation. The core of the 
knowledge management challenge lies in creating a perfect balance of knowledge supply and 
demand. Google.com the leading Internet search engine company, is an excellent example of 
this dynamic. (For more details see the article by Fred Vogelstein in Fortune, May 27, 2002). 
The company’s founders Brin and Page, who left Stanford’s PhD program to start the company, 
recognised that a network could be built from existing out-sourced commodity hardware. In this 
case, knowledge was extracted from its original appropriators (server, software and 
telecommunication companies), and diffused by Google, who could bundle and replicate their 
knowledge. More capital-intensive processes followed simple replication of this kind. What 
came next was the combination with other knowledge, such as revenue earning advertising 
practises, to assemble a new goods package that came to be known as the Google market.  
 
As in Google’s case, an important point of change in the new economy is that knowledge is 
being made explicit, being appropriated by others, being diffused and replicated, and is 
becoming industrialised. Knowledge is produced in large volumes at lower cost.  External 
knowledge providers (service companies such as IT, billing and consultancy providers) are 
changing the nature of the firm, as they provide a substitution for the tacit knowledge base 
previously controlled by the firm. The implication is that vertical integration and diversification 
patterns will become unsustainable. As knowledge changes, proprietary links give way to 
market relationships under labels such as outsourcing, deconstruction and the hollowing-out of 
the corporation. 
 
As knowledge production has grown in response to market growth over the past twenty five 
years, it has become more specialised and more diverse in its sources.  It has moved from being 
a cottage industry to being an industrialised activity.  Portions of knowledge are originally 
produced and appropriated for use by individuals or individual firms. How this outside 
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knowledge is used and absorbed by a company has become an important success factor. 
Google’s flexible system, based on the knowledge of several suppliers, reduced the risk of 
becoming outmoded by rapid developments. Its knowledge providers, or suppliers, handle the 
strain and expense of technological change.  Google managed to build a business based on 
searches where Alta Vista, Yahoo, Lycos, Excite, and Infoseek, had failed.  
Value Chains: From Integrated  to Reconstructed Networks 
The serial decisions of ‘assembly’ versus the ‘purchase’ of customised products, which is 
exemplified by the Google case, reflect changing economic circumstances and shifts in relative 
costs.  There has been an extensive change in the nature of knowledge investment and 
production leading to a further change in the supply and demand for knowledge. Quinn (2001) 
describes these pervasive changes in six distinct phases.  
 
In the first phase, economies of scale are created as large organisations capture key activities, 
leading to the demise of smaller enterprises that lack capital and expertise. In the second phase, 
economies of scope come about as the same technologies that created the economies of scale, 
allow the handling of more data, more output functions, or more customers without 
corresponding cost increases. 
 
 However, changes in the fundamental conditions of demand and supply of knowledge can lead 
to the next phase - disintermediation.  Disintermediation is the process by which proprietary 
links within the firm give way to the co-ordination mechanisms of markets. It refers to the 
piecemeal replacement of internal activities by external provision.  Where this replacement is 
systematic and extensive it is known as deconstruction – the process of systematically 
undermining fundamental concepts (in this case the logic of vertical integration). Next, we enter 
a phase of deregulation in  the sense that increased competition replaces the regulation imposed 
through vertical integration and semi-monopolistic competition. In this scenario, new 
competitors with new knowledge make cross-competition more possible. 
 
Finally, there are rounds of redispersion and redecentralisation due to a reassertion of the need 
for more localised and personalised contact as new forms of broking, selling, and agencies 
emerge.  
 
To summarise, the systematic accretion of knowledge and its diffusion around the world has had 
the effect of forcing a restructuring of industries even to the extent that entire economies have 
been fundamentally changed. The open standards and the universal connectivity inherent in 
information technology enable knowledge modules to be ‘snapped together’ similar to a Lego 
system, without any expensive customisation or re-working. 
 
With the widespread acceptance of international division of labour in knowledge, there are 
further characteristics inherent in the new economy.  The first is that knowledge-based functions 
are significant elements in most value chains and that these are significant in size and critical for 
competitive advantage.  The second is that the pressures of competition mean that simple 
technical efficiency is not enough.  There are opportunity costs of not buying from the most 
efficient suppliers and outsourcing becomes not only attractive but also necessary.  Third and 
most important, firms need to focus their strategic investments and their management attention 
on those knowledge-intensive activities that form the basis for sustainable competitive 
advantage.  This means that it is no longer sufficient to maintain a portfolio of competencies in 
which most of the competencies are at best only co-specialised with the core competencies.  
Historically firms have invested capital in those journeyman competencies that were required to 
bring the truly distinctive assets, the core competencies, to market.  Now, however, they do have 
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the prospect of replacing them with lower cost or more effective substitutes from external 
suppliers.  
Through this mechanism we are witnessing the development of three new business models: the 
new competitor; the deconstructed value chain; and the reconstructed value chain (Evans and 
Wurster, 2000).   
 
The New Competitor mounts direct attacks on established businesses by splitting the 
information flows from the physical flows. Thus, the success of business hinges on two levels of 
transaction: the traditional flow of products to the supply channels, and the flow of information 
from the company to the customer, via channels such as the Internet. Figure 1 illustrates these 
two levels.  
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In Amazon.com the business model is not simply the replacement of an expensive shopping 
process (for the customer) by cheap electronic means, but also an approach of differentiation 
aimed at turning a direct online bookseller into a virtual focal point.   
 
The approach of Egg in the UK to online financial services is much the same.  Prudential 
launched Egg 1998 to offer products and services in banking, investments, insurance and online 
shopping. Egg is designed for the Internet generation using the Internet at the primary medium 
of consumer contact. It has a strong focus on technology by combine the characteristics of a 
conventional direct business with automated customer relationship management. 
 
In both the cases of Amazon and Egg, the very high fixed costs of online selling are defrayed 
not just by high volumes but also by the economies of scope that follow from diversification 
channelled through the online shopping point.  Evans and Wurster (2000) in their well-known 
book about deconstruction and being ‘Blown to Bits’ make the same point with an example 
about separating the information-rich part from the commodity part.    
 
The Deconstruction Model, in Figure 2, stems from the need to focus the firm’s attention on 
those few, typically knowledge-based activities that underpin long term competitive advantage.  
To do this the firm has to redefine its remaining capabilities as activities which can be bought in 
from ‘best-in-class’ suppliers.  This applies equally to overhead ‘services’ as much as it does 
elsewhere in the value chain.  In this way the firm becomes less vertically integrated in the 
conventional way - it has to deny the old saying that ‘what it does not own it cannot command’.  
However it does maintain its control of the value chain and of the advantages accruing to the 
customer by actively reinforcing the core competencies which it has retained (more on this 
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below) and by investing in the management of its outsourcing so as to maintain its bargaining 
power with its (new) suppliers and partners.   
 
 
outsource
collaborate
core
competence
outsource collaborate
new capabilities
product design
CAD/CAM
logistics
databases
Economics of information
fragments value chains
and erodes advantage
supply
burgeoning
new
intermediaries
demand
high growth
broadening
& deepening
Figure 2 The Deconstruction Model:  Disintermediating  
 
 
In Figure 3 there is a battle for control in the deconstructed model of the supply chain – a battle 
for ownership and control of competitive advantage.   One mode of operation occurs when 
integration gives way to orchestration.  Successful orchestrators possess powerful brands and 
other core competences that give them competitive advantage by virtue of which they can 
control the terms of supply (see Figure 3).  Nike and Hewlett-Packard are examples of this 
mode.  The orchestrators retain sufficient idiosyncratic capital to preserve some degree of 
vertical integration sufficient to exercise power throughout the supply chain.  But control over 
the supply chain depends on the location of knowledge in the chain.   
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Figure 3 The Deconstruction Model: Orchestrating Downstream
 
 
Those players who focus on a specific value-added step have incentives for scale and scope 
effects with the possibility of wresting control from the traditional integrated players (see Figure 
4).  Intel and Microsoft did this to IBM because IBM was not able to control the IBM standard 
for PC’s.   
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Instead Intel’s microprocessor technology and Microsoft’s software represented the key 
knowledge assets which then dominated the supply chain.  In the extreme case, the integrated 
firms deconstruct entirely with each value-added step in the supply chain becoming a business 
in its own right.  Competition is then fragmented, products become near-commodities, and rents 
are minimal and transitory.   
The Reconstruction Model has two elements.  The first applies existing core competences into 
other value chains to establish new economies of scale there and in doing so creating new 
economies of scope (see Figure 5).   
 
 
 
This is familiar in that it replicates well-known processes of related diversification.  But it is  
 
different in that it represents an attempt to dominate other apparently related supply chains with 
existing knowledge-based competences.  In this process, the nature of scope has changed from 
product-market relatedness to knowledge (or resource) relatedness.  In this resource-based view 
of the corporate portfolio, competition is as much a competition for competences and for 
knowledge as its more familiar application to products Evans & Wurster have dubbed this the 
‘rewiring’ of the firm in which knowledge-based competences have become the controlling 
element in multiple supply chains through several highly focussed (i.e. short) value chains (see 
Figure 6).   
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value chain 2
e.g. computer games
value chain 3
e.g. movies
outsourcing
collaboration
knowledge
transfer
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Figure 5 The Reconstruction Model:  Knowledge Transfer  
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Figure 4 The Deconstruction Model:  Orchestrating Upstream 
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The second element is the creation of a new set of corporate level capabilities whose purpose is 
to identify and manage the set of collaborative relationships that make up the web of partners 
and strategic suppliers.  Indeed the vertical integration metaphor of the value chain gives way to 
the language of the value web (see Figure 7).  The centre of the web contains the new corporate 
glue (idiosyncratic knowledge) that maintains the new style of portfolio positions across value 
chains and across industries and orchestrates strategic linkages so as to retain control over the 
traditional value chains.  The points of leverage for this core competence are the specific 
knowledge based assets that are applied across different industries.  In this new game companies 
can develop a much higher degree of focus in applying their strategies through their knowledge-
based assets rather than through traditional product market strategies.   
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Figure 7 The Value Web  
 
In general, the focus of strategic thinking has shifted from domination of markets and of supply 
chains through a vertically integrated set of activities to an assertion of leading positions in key 
intellectual assets coupled with new thinking at the corporate centre about knowledge 
management, risk assessment, and the management of information and knowledge.  The focus 
has shifted from products and product classes to activities, knowledge and competencies. 
Positive Feedback in Network Industries 
In this section we look at how the old industrial economy was characterised by economies of 
scale and scope, whilst the new information economy is driven by the economics of positive 
feedback in network industries. We will discuss the nature of network industries, such as 
railroads, telecommunications, software and hardware networks. We will see how network 
companies benefit from positive feedback on both on the demand-side and supply-side. On the 
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demand-side, the more customers join a network, such as a telecommunications service, the 
higher the incentive for other customers to join. On the supply-side, the larger a network 
becomes in terms of users and also in size of assets deployed, the easier it is for a company to 
lower costs and prices. The lower the price introduced by a network company, the more 
subscribers will join the network and positive feedback kicks in. The result is a positive spiral. 
The importance of critical mass, competition and standards is discussed in the light of the 
dynamics of positive feedback. 
The Old World: Economies of Scale and Scope 
In the Old World of the industrial economy firms seeking market power could do so by virtue of 
barriers of entry created by economies of scale. Saloner et al (2001) identify three types of entry 
barriers, barriers from production or distribution technology, barriers from brand name or 
reputation, and legal barriers (p.138).  The first two are essentially cost barriers in that 
replication of the incumbent’s assets is inhibited by the costs of so doing.  The third type is an 
absolute barrier that arises from institutional characteristics that are idiosyncratic from a market 
point of view. 
 
Diversified firms required an additional force: economies of scope.  These are defined as ‘the 
cost savings realised when two different products are produced within the same organisation 
rather than at separate organisations’ (Saloner et al. p. 364).  The products would share a 
common input such as plant or equipment, obtaining volume discounts on purchases, or 
applying common expertise or reputation.  In such a situation, where competition is 
monopolistic (or imperfect) producers may attempt to shape customer preferences. They may 
succeed in modifying the demand function to become downward sloping in the conventional 
manner and producers can then price according to the nature of their marginal cost curves and 
the to the price elasticities in the market.  However, demand and supply are mediated through a 
market mechanism in which product demand is independent of other products and demand is 
not time dependent. This exaggerates the point, as we will see later when we discuss product 
complementarity. 
 
There is a class of markets and industries that do not conform with the assumptions of the Old 
World. These are the network industries. In this discussion the terms ‘industry’ and ‘market’ are 
used as if interchangeable.   
The New World of Network Industries 
The concept of network can be segmented into real and virtual networks (Shapiro, Varian, 
1999). Real networks are found in industries such as telephony and railways were a physical 
network is present. Virtual networks are typified by computer and software platforms where the 
interconnection between users is intangible. The two types of networks are discussed below. 
In real networks the interconnection between users is tangible. Examples are cable networks for 
telephone users and radio transmissions in mobile phones. Electricity  grids, 
telecommunications networks encompassing telephones, fax machines, on-line services, and the 
Internet, are typical examples of products or services within real networks. There are one-way 
networks such as broadcast television where information flows in one direction only., In two-
way networks, such as railroads and telephone systems, links are operated in both directions 
Any network may be viewed as a set of connections (links) between nodes.  A two-way network 
allows the links to be operated in both directions whereas a one-way network has distinct 
directionality.  Two-way networks include railroads and telephone systems.  Figure 8 shows a 
simple star network where A can communicate with B through a switch S.  B can also 
communicate with A by reversing the direction of the link (viz. a telephone call).  In Figure 8 
we have eight nodes (A through G) linked through a switch S.  If this were a two-way-network 
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AB and BA would be distinct products (different telephone calls, different rail journeys).  The 
total number of products in the network would be 56, i.e. n(n-1) where n = the number of nodes.  
If there were to be a ninth member (the dotted lines to I in Figure 8) this would increase the total 
number of products to 72 (n is now 9), a total increase of 16 products available from the 
expanded network.  If the value to each user of being in the network is proportional to the 
number of users then the value of this network has just increased by 28.5 % (16 as a % of 56) 
even though the size of the network has increased by only 12.5 % (one added to eight). For 
convenience it is assumed in this example that prices are constant.  This is an algebraic 
characteristic of network economies of scale that the value rises disproportionately higher than 
the increase in network size as long as prices are constant and products are independent.  
Intuitively we might expect that an increase in network size beyond a certain point has little 
value. (Using calculus we would expect the first derivative to be positive but the second 
derivative to be negative.  Therefore total value increases but at a decreasing rate.)  If this 
network were a one-way network there would be half the number of products but the value of 
the network would nevertheless increase at the same rate but achieving only half the value.  
 
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H S
I
Figure 8: A Two Way Network
 
 
In virtual networks the interconnections between users is intangible, but users remain 
interdependent. Computer systems are typical of virtual networks. For example Mac users are 
part of the Mac network, with Apple as the sponsor of the network. Mac users are locked into a 
network determined by the technology standard of this platform. They can only use software 
that is compatible to the system and will exchange files with users within the system. Operating 
systems such as Windows and Unix are other examples of virtual networks. The virtual network 
dynamics also operate in the entertainment industry for Sony Playstation, Microsoft Xbox and 
Nintendo’s Gamecube networks.  
 
Network size is still important in virtual networks in that a large consumer base makes 
production viable and usage possible. In addition the value of a product increases as the number 
of, or the variety of, the complementary goods or services increases. Indirect network effects in 
the computer industry are referred to as the hardware-software paradigm. The success of an 
operating system for personal computers depends on the variety of software applications 
available in the market. Value may depend more critically on software applications.  
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Network Externalities: The New Economic Forces 
Earlier in the paper we have looked at the traditional economic model for the ‘old world’ which 
was driven by economies of scale and scope. The ‘new world’, characterised by information and 
communications technology is governed by a different dynamic. Network externalities are the 
new drivers of the network economy. It is important to recognise that economies of scale/scope 
and network externalities represent the extreme ends of a spectrum of effects, and that the 
presence of one does not imply the exclusion of the other. Companies may experience the 
effects of both to varying degrees, with a tendency for network externalities to have more 
strategic relevance in the new network economy.  
 
The concept of network externalities has attracted the attention of academics and practitioners 
alike. The extent to which network industries have proliferated in the economy is a recent 
phenomenon. The effect of network externalities however have been recognised for some time 
with the development of the older network companies such as the railroads and the electricity 
systems. (In 1804 Trevithick constructed the first practical locomotive in England. In 1882 the 
Edison Electric Lighting Company completed the first commercial generating station at Holborn 
Viaduct in London. The first commercial telephone line was installed in Boston, Massachusetts 
in 1877.)  
 
Network externalities are defined as the increasing utility that a user derives from consumption 
of a product as the number of other users who consume the same product increases (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985). For example, the more people there are in a telephone network the more users 
can be reached on the network, thereby increasing its usability. A network externality is the 
increase in the net value of an action that occurs as the number of agents taking equivalent 
actions increases (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). Fax machines, broadcast industry services, 
credit card networks, and computer hardware and software are examples of products exhibiting 
network externalities.  
According to Economides & Flyer (1997): 
 
‘The value of nearly every good is influenced by aggregate consumption levels 
in its market and in the markets for related goods.  In many cases, high 
aggregate consumption in its own market, and in the markets for complementary 
goods affects positively the value of a good.  Traditionally such effects have been 
called network externalities, since they were first identified in network 
industries.  While such effects are salient in some markets, such as for 
telephones, fax machines and computer operating systems, for most goods these 
influences are more subtle and tend to be smaller.’ 
Complementarity in Network Products 
An important element is the notion of complementarity, thus the value of a railway station is 
derived from the existence of other railway stations on the network.  A weaker definition relies 
also on complementarity between products (or nodes, in network language) but allows the links 
to be created by the customer rather than for the customer.  Economides & Flyer (1997) have 
some powerful examples: 
‘..the value of a washing machine is affected by the aggregate consumption of 
washing machines and the consumption level of the particular brand, since this 
determines the availability of parts, repairmen, detergents, fabric softeners and 
various other related goods and services.  The value of a sporting event is 
influenced by the aggregate size of the audience, as this enhances the excitement 
level, analysis, discussion and remembrance of the event.  Even a grapefruit is 
influenced by network externalities, since the variety of accessible complements, 
Pre print copy    
 
Reference of published article: McGee, John and Sammut-Bonnici, Tanya. (2002) Network industries in 
the new economy. European Business Journal, Volume 14 (Number 5). pp. 116-132. ISSN 0955-808X 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
such as peeler, slicers, juicers, recipes, nutritional information and specialised 
spoons, are affected by the aggregate consumption of the fruit.’ 
 
The essence of this idea is that the demand for a product is influenced by total demand for the 
product class or by total demand in a complementary product class.  Thus demand is 
conditioned by a consumer externality.  Where these consumer externalities are powerful, the 
feedback effect on demand is such that there is a tendency towards a single network, or 
platform, or standard.  The value for consumers of being on a common standard outweighs any 
specific differences between alternative standards.  We see that the VHS standard was preferred 
to a ‘technically better’ Betamax rival to the extent that the rival standard disappeared.  The 
Wintel standard is greatly preferred to the Apple standard and the rival exists only as a small 
niche in the market.  Where the externality is smaller and the intrinsic difference between 
standards is relatively larger then we might observe multiple competing and coexisting 
‘platforms’. (To observe multiple standards defies common sense, hence the term ‘platform’ 
which denotes an array of linked complementary products that together are compatible with 
other products). An example of a platform can be seen in the automobile industry where a 
company might develop a core of components and sub-assemblies that can be used to support 
alternative body styling to create a product range.  Such a platform can co-exist with other 
platforms because the scale efficiencies associated with platforms is modest in relation to 
market size.  
 
The analysis of complementarity is equivalent to the analysis of a 1-way network.  Figure 8 can 
be extended as in Figure 9 to show a typical 1-way network.  Here we can interpret the Ai as 
Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) and the Bj as banks.  The network runs only from A to B.  
The significance of the two switches SA and SB is that they have only one link.  This means that 
there is compatibility between all ATMs and all banks.  This maximises the value of the 
network but increases the competition between banks for customers through ATMs. (Two 
complementary components A and B are compatible when they can be combined to produce a 
composite good.  A VHS player is compatible with VHS tapes.  Two substitute components A1 
and A2 are compatible when each of them can be combined with a complementary good B to 
produce a composite good.  Thus two VHS tapes are compatible, and two VHS players are 
compatible.) It is this compatibility that makes the complementarity actual and the network 
operational.  For complex products actual complementarity has to be achieved through 
adherence to specific technical standards.  Other complementary products can be visualised in 
terms of Figure 9.  VHS tapes could be the Ai and VHS players could be the Bj.  Think also of 
copier paper and copiers, or printer paper and printers, or car accessories and cars, or local and 
long distance telephone networks.   
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Networks were originally analysed on the assumption that each network was owned by a single 
firm and research concentrated on the efficient use of the network structure and on the 
appropriate allocation of costs (Economides 1996, Sharkey 1993).  With the anti-trust cases 
against AT&T and its later break-up attention shifted towards economies of scope, the 
efficiency gains from joint operation of complementary components of networks (Baumol, 
Panzar & Willig 1982).  This led to issues of interconnection and compatibility in parallel with 
the reduced role of IBM in the 80’s and 90’s in the setting of technical standards in computer 
hardware and software.  As technology has advanced, there have been significant reductions in 
telecommunications costs and a shift towards fragmented ownership of telecommunications 
networks.  Market structure has shifted from natural monopoly to oligopoly.  Similar trends are 
evident in other IT-intensive industries.  Thus, the focus of interest in network economics has 
shifted from the analysis of natural monopoly towards issues of interconnection, compatibility, 
interoperability and co-ordination of quality.   
Network Externalities and the Battle for Critical Mass 
For normal goods, the demand curve slopes downwards. As price decreases, more of the 
product is demanded.  Other elements in the demand function such as income or advertising 
serve as ‘demand shifters’ and would elevate the demand to a higher level. Figure 10 illustrates 
the traditional role of a demand shifter.  Higher levels of consumption are derived from higher 
incomes (positive income elasticities) or from lower prices (negative price elasticities).  
A
1 A
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A
3 
A
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B
1 
B
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B
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B
4 
Figure 9  A One-way 
Network 
 A   B  
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This fundamental relationship is greatly distorted in the presence of external consumption 
economies (network externalities). In the presence of network externalise, we specify that sales 
rise as accumulated sales (the installed base) rises and we obtain a chicken and the egg paradox.  
Customers may not be interested in purchasing because the installed base is small and/or not 
expected to grow. Imagine the purchase of complex software without internet support, help 
lines, and user groups. Alternatively, there may be confident expectations that the installed base 
will grow substantially and therefore consumers will confidently make purchases. The paradox 
is that consumers will not buy if the installed base is too low.  However, the installed base is too 
low because customers will not buy.  The crux of the paradox lies in the management of 
expectations (see the second paper in this series). In markets for normal goods, equilibrium is 
explained in terms of a balance between costs and demand, between marginal costs and 
marginal utility.  In network markets, there is also equilibrium to be struck between actual 
demand and expectations of total demand.   
 
This gives rise to an economic paradox.  Almost the first law of economics is that value comes 
from scarcity.  However, in the New World economy value comes from plenty: the more 
something is demanded and the more it is expected to be demanded then the more valuable it 
becomes.  Expectations are so important in driving demand that a point exists where the 
momentum is so overwhelming that success becomes a runaway event and we observe a 
‘Winner Take All’ phenomenon.   
Pric
e 
Quantit
y 
D0/installed base 
(t=0) 
D1/installed base 
(t=1) 
Figure 10   Demand Shifts due to the Installed Base 
extra value from  
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The ‘tipping point’ is when the installed base (or size of network) tips expectations sharply 
towards one player (or one network) and away from its rival. We have experienced this effect 
when we moved towards Windows as our prevailing computer operating system, rather than 
OS2. Another example of tipping would be IBM versus Apple as shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12   Market Share of IBM and Apple 
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The exception to the Winner takes All phenomenon would be a regulated network market with 
strong interconnections between competing platforms. The mobile telephone industry is a 
classic example. The standards are harmonised across the network providers, at least by 
continental region. The platforms are inter-linked and the sales curves of the regulated network 
providers follow the pattern of the overall subscription curve for the industry.  
 
Traditional economic thinking is based on negative feedback systems in which the strong get 
weaker at the margin and the weak get stronger thus providing a drive towards a competitive 
equilibrium.  This is captured in economics by the concept of diminishing marginal utility as 
consumption grows. In the New World of networks, positive feedback rules.  In this world the 
valuation of a product increases the more that others consume the product. Strictly speaking, it 
arises from the interdependence of consumer decisions whereas diminishing marginal utility 
dominates when consumer decisions are independent – the normal assumption in economics. 
Whereas in the demand curve where the price-quantity relationship is normally held to be 
downward sloping, the equivalent demand curve for a network product should be drawn 
differently  (Figure 13). The value to the consumer of a network product is reflected in the price 
he is willing to pay – the vertical axis.  The principal driver of value is the size of the network, 
also referred to as the installed base, is shown on the horizontal axis.  Quantity demanded does 
still have an effect on price but for these products, this is secondary to the network effect.  
 
K
Price
Network Size: N
C1
C2
OS1OS2OS3
Figure 13 The Network Demand Curve
The Idea of Optimal Size
intrinsic
value
strong 
network
effects
diminishing
network 
effects
 
 
The initial upward slope of the curve reflects a rising valuation at the margin, as consumers 
perceive that they gain value by virtue of other consumers having the product.  Being on the 
Wintel standard gives value to new users.  However, as the network grows the extra consumers 
at the margin are less valuable – that is this shape assumes that those users with higher potential 
valuation of the network will join first.  As the network gets very large, further growth has less 
value for future customers.  The Intercept on the vertical axis represents the value the network 
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product has a stand-alone product.  Thus a Wintel computer has some stand-alone value, but a 
telephone has no value on its own and is a pure network good. 
There is a notion of an optimal size of a network.  This can be seen from the interaction of 
demand and cost so that as less and less valuable customers join the network there may come a 
point where the costs of acquiring and servicing new customers begins to exceed the price those 
customers are willing to pay.  This determines the optimal size and has significant implications 
for competition. 
 
P P P
N N N
Case  A Case  B Case  C
intrinsic value zero high very high
marginal value very high very high modest
OS rel to mkt size very high low high?
pure network goods high value in small networks normal with network benefits
e.g. telephone, fax e.g specialised programs e.g. word processing programs
Figure 14 Alternative Network Demand Configurations
 
 
The three configurations above indicate the range of possibilities.  The first is a pure network 
good, such as a telephone system, in which the optimal size of network is a very high proportion 
of the available market.  This implies there is little or no room for a rival networks.  The second 
is a product with a significant intrinsic value but attracts a modest size group of users.  For 
example, this could be a corporate software package (e.g. enterprise solutions) that attracts 
dedicated user support from the supplier through the web.  Alternative networks could co-exist.  
The third case is one of very high intrinsic demand but extensive consumer interactions (small 
in size but several in number) provide a substantial total network value.  The obvious example is 
word processing software where the value from standardising on MS Word is very high with the 
result that alternative standards (such as Word Perfect) are being frozen out of the market even 
though the intrinsic value of any word processing package is high. 
Networks, Standards, and Competition 
According to Economides and Flyer (1997) 
‘Firms that compete in markets where network externalities are present face 
unique trade-offs regarding the choice of a technical standard.  Adhering to a 
leading compatibility standard allows a firm’s product to capture the value 
added by a large network.  However, simultaneously the firm loses direct control 
over the market supply of the good and faces (direct) intra-platform competition.  
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Alternatively, adhering to a unique standard allows the firm to face less or no 
intra-platform competition, but it sacrifices the added value associated with a 
large network.’  
This trade-off is a key strategic decision that depends in part on the control that firms have in 
making their output compatible with competitors’ outputs and complementary products. The 
ability to conform to a common standard opens the opportunity to make this trade-off.  Where 
standards are proprietary the decision rests with the owner of the standard. The owner’s trade-
off is the pay-off associated with developing the existing network and its spillovers versus the 
introduction of more intra-platform competition.  Essentially the trade-off is the same: to adhere 
to a common standard or seek uniqueness.  This can be expressed as a sequential game: At the 
outset, one chooses the appropriate technical standard (and, therefore, the network to join), and 
later one chooses how to compete.  Normal markets do not have this choice of network and 
there are consequences for market structure and competition of the presence of network 
externalities. This section relies on the mathematical model in Economides and Flyer (1997).  
This defines networks as coalition structures and analyses the stability of coalitions under 
different standards regimes and varying levels of network externalities.  There are a number of 
implications for market structure in the presence of network externalities. 
 
First, it is intuitively and tautologically clear that industry output will be higher when there are 
network externalities and when standards are open. Firms are free to choose which standard to 
adopt and are deterred only by the costs of adoption.  Second, when standards are incompatible 
and the owners of standards can exercise proprietary control, then incumbents are more strongly 
protected against the consequences of entry.  Moreover, there will usually be considerable 
asymmetries between firms in terms of outputs, prices, and profits.  (Under incompatibility 
regimes firms are equivalent to platforms and constitute one firm networks). For pure network 
goods the asymmetries are particularly marked.  In general with total incompatibility of 
standards market concentration, output inequality and price and profit inequality increase with 
the extent of the network externality.  This is an important result because it explains why 
network industries are so often dominated by one or two firms.  The mechanism is 
straightforward.  The leading network establishes its critical mass, leaving the second network 
to establish a critical mass across the remaining untapped market coverage.  The third network 
follows in the same fashion and so on.  It follows that there will be a tendency to provide large 
incentives to organise customers into few platforms so as to maximise the added value from the 
available networks. Firms will be keen to abandon their own weak standards in favour of the 
higher value obtainable from a leading network. Economides and Flyer (1997) observe that 
(under strong assumptions of perfect intra-platform competition) the ratio of outputs between 
networks adjacent in size is approximately 162% and for prices and profits is even higher. 
 
There is a third implication. Where there are proprietary standards and strong network effects 
there is no natural equilibrium in terms of network offerings.  There are always incentives for at 
least one firm to move to a stronger network and the consequences of any one move is to shift 
the incentives for all other firms.  However, equilibrium can be reinforced by the refusal of 
firms to make their proprietary standards available.  Again, the mechanism is straightforward.  
Under strong externalities, the owner of a standard has a considerable incentive to exploit the 
standard by itself and to exclude other firms with weaker standards.  Conversely, where the 
externality is weak, the owner will find that a stronger incentive to admit other firms to its 
proprietary standard in order to grow the network through collective effort and thus generate 
more added value.   
 
In summary, strong network externalities suggest the following conclusions: 
1. Larger industry output, 
2. Very large asymmetries between firms/platforms, 
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3. Likelihood of market dominance, 
4. Enhancement and protection of proprietary standards 
5. Equilibrium market structures that are the reverse of the world without network 
externalities. 
This suggests some rules that govern the New Economy. 
 
1. The Information Economy depends on connectivity.  Without connectivity, consumer 
interdependence is indirect. Positive feedback gives a Law of Plenty – more gives more. 
2. The competition between rival networks/standards can be hard to call in advance.  
Management of expectations is key and    ‘Tippy Markets’ are common.  
3. Commonly this is a game where the up front costs are very large and the revenues are 
substantially delayed and are significantly at risk. 
4. As a result, this is a ‘Winner Takes All’ world. 
5. It is also a world of immense uncertainty where even the range of potential outcomes is not 
known but also where there is a significant probability that future technological change 
might undermine an apparently winning position. 
6. There is a Law of Inverse Pricing.  The best (i.e. the most valuable in the future) products 
are given away, such as web browsers, in order to create a consumer standard, and sheer 
volume causes both marginal costs and prices to fall over time as the product becomes more 
valuable.  The cash flow machine is modest (even small) margins multiplied by gigantic 
volumes to defray massive investments.  The machine is volume driven and protected by 
very large switching costs.   
7. Open standards are the key to volume.  Protected standards are only viable as small high 
priced niche markets. 
8. The first strategic choice is what network to join.  The second, and a long way behind, is 
how to compete within the network of choice. 
A new set of strategies are emerging to offset the risks and pressures exerted by the rules listed 
above. This is visible in the setting up of global standards and their ensuing platforms. For 
examples, Group Speciale Mobile commonly known as GSM is an association of 600 network 
operators and suppliers of the mobile phone industry. Their primary objective is to set a 
common standard for mobile communications in order to create a homogenous industry were 
equipment, software and networks can seamlessly talk to each other. Strategies of 
standardisation are stabilising the markets and charting the course for research and development 
policies.   
Conclusion 
This paper establishes two propositions. First, the supply of knowledge has a distinctive cost 
structure that makes large volumes extremely important.  As (globalising) markets have grown, 
so has specialisation in the production of knowledge with consequences for companies in terms 
of outsourcing of activities and for new, more focused approaches to their own knowledge base 
and to the acquisition of knowledge from outside.  This has led to three new, distinctive 
business models: 
(i) The new competitor who uses new, typically electronic channels to challenge existing 
businesses and to engineer new economies of scope which have the effect of transforming 
(potentially) the wider competitive landscape. 
Pre print copy    
 
Reference of published article: McGee, John and Sammut-Bonnici, Tanya. (2002) Network industries in 
the new economy. European Business Journal, Volume 14 (Number 5). pp. 116-132. ISSN 0955-808X 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
(ii) The deconstruction model in which the value chain is slimmed down to those elements 
in which clear advantage is evident. Control over the entire supply chain and, therefore, 
profitability depends on the location of the most significant knowledge components in the 
supply chain. 
(iii) The reconstruction model builds on deconstruction but the knowledge assets are 
deployed into adjacent and apparently unrelated supply chains with the effect of transferring 
knowledge and (potentially) controlling these supply chains. 
These economic characteristics of knowledge are dependent in large part on the 
interconnectivity that is characteristic of the technologies of information goods.  
Interconnectivity allows customers to view, use, and link products, giving rise to virtual 
networks of customers.  In these networks, powerful demand-side increasing returns can operate 
giving rise to our second proposition.  Where consumer-based externalities are powerful there 
are strong pressures towards ‘winner-takes-all’ phenomena (e.g. Wintel globally, and Sky TV in 
the UK).  In these circumstances conventional economic laws are challenged.  De facto 
monopoly can emerge: but uncertainty is high and markets may be intrinsically unstable.  
Successive waves of technology may outmode old monopolies and serve as the basis for new 
monopolies. 
In our forthcoming paper we argue that there are significant implications for firms arising from 
both of these propositions.  In particular, collaboration between firms becomes almost essential 
requiring a complex balance to be struck between collaboration and competition. 
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